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1 Introduction
When the leaders of the Pathet Lao, a communist
guerrilla force established in Laos in 1950, took
power in that country in 1975, the economy was in
ruins. Two decades of fighting between royalist and
capitalist forces on one side, and communist forces
on the other, had resulted in great loss of life and
widespread destruction of livelihoods and property.
With the Pathet Lao siding with the North
Vietnamese communist forces against the Americans
during the Vietnam War, Laos became a target of
American military action. A massive bombing
campaign conducted by the Americans between
1964 and 1973 aimed at cutting off the Ho Chi Minh
Trail, a network of paths running through Laos and
Vietnam, along which North Vietnamese soldiers
and supplies passed, caused massive destruction and
displaced almost one-quarter of the Lao population
from their homes. At the same time, the end of the
War in 1975 led to a massive flight of both capital
and people. Vientiane, the capital, had developed a
booming economy during the War based on the
provision of services to US soldiers. With the end of
the War, this activity – and the US aid that had
supported it – came to an end. To escape poverty
and in some cases persecution, many Lao fled
overseas (Thalemann 1997: 89; Stuart-Fox 1986: 99;
Economist Intelligence Unit 2004: 7).
Over the next decade, Laos – or, more precisely, the
Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR), as the
country became known after 1975 – struggled to
recover from this state. The communist victory in
1975 brought relative peace and political stability to
the country. But peace and political stability did not
translate into ‘turnaround’. The first few years of
communist rule were marked by economic
stagnation rather than sustained economic growth.
According to International Monetary Fund (IMF)
estimates, the country’s economy grew by 10 per
cent in real terms in 1980 and by a further 6 per cent
in 1981. But the country failed to sustain this level of
economic growth, experiencing only modest
economic growth in 1982 and a severe contraction in
1983 (Stuart-Fox 1986: 106). At the same time, living
standards in the LPDR improved little during this
period. In 1985, annual per capita income was
estimated by the government to be US$135, placing
the LPDR among the poorest of poor countries.
Reflecting this, as well as the country’s low health
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Figure 1 Human development in the LPDR and its neighbours
and literacy standards (Zasloff 1991: 3–4), the
country’s human development index (HDI) stood at
0.422 in 1985, significantly lower than the HDIs of its
neighbours, Vietnam, Thailand and China (Figure 1).
From the mid-1980s onwards, however, the LPDR
began to make much more significant progress vis-à-
vis turnaround. The economy contracted during 1987
and 1988 but bounced back strongly in 1989,
growing by over 14 per cent that year. Between 1990
and 1997, the economy continued to grow strongly,
achieving at least 6 per cent growth every year
except 1992, when it achieved 4 per cent growth
and 1993, when it achieved just less than 6 per cent
growth (Figure 2). The onset of the Asian economic
crisis in 1997–8 brought this period of rapid
economic growth to an end. But although growth
has been much more modest since 1998, it has still
been strong compared with the first decade of
communist rule and numerous other low-income
countries. At the same time, the country
experienced a marked improvement in human
development during this period, with its HDI rising
from 0.422 in 1985 to 0.525 in 2001. Finally, the
country achieved these changes without
experiencing severe violent conflict of the sort that
had characterised its political history prior to the
communist victory in 1975.
The purpose of this article is to explain the LPDR’s
changing fortunes vis-à-vis turnaround since 1975. In
doing so, it focuses both on the agency of the
country’s political leaders and the structural context
within which they have been located. It is argued
that the country’s poor performance on turnaround
during the first decade and a half of communist rule
reflected, on the one hand, poor economic
management on the part of the political leadership
and, on the other, various factors related to the
country’s location in the global political economy.
While the decisive victory of the communists in 1975
facilitated the achievement of political stability, these
factors worked against strong economic
performance. The country’s progress between the
mid-1980s and 2004, it is argued, reflected changes
both in the leadership’s approach to economic policy
making and in the global political economy as well as
the government’s continued ability to maintain
political control.
I present this analysis in the next three sections.
Section 2 examines the reasons for the LPDR’s
failure to achieve turnaround between 1975 and
1985, Section 3 examines the reasons for the
country’s progress towards turnaround between
1986 and 2004 and Section 4 presents the
conclusions.
2 The political economy of failure to achieve
turnaround, 1975–86
The victory of the Pathet Lao in 1975 in the war
against US and royalist forces brought relative peace
and political stability to Laos. The Pathet Lao’s victory
was decisive. The end of the war meant the
withdrawal of US military forces from the region and
an end to very substantial US financial support for the
royalist government, in turn dramatically reducing the
capacity of royalist elements to resist the communist
takeover. At the same time, the Vietnamese
government stationed tens of thousands of troops
within the country to help the new government with
security (Economist Intelligence Unit 2004: 12). Within
this context, the leaders of the Pathet Lao were able
to establish their political supremacy quickly. Within
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Figure 2 Real economic growth in the LPDR and its neighbours, 1985–2002
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months of entering Vientiane in August 1975, they had
forced the abdication of King Savang Vatthana,
declared the establishment of the LPDR, named
Prince Souphanouvong (the so-called ‘Red Prince’) as
President, and outlawed all political parties other than
the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), the
political arm of the Pathet Lao. At the same time,
they also incarcerated tens of thousands of political
opponents and sent another 40,000 or so people to
re-education camps (Economist Intelligence Unit
2004: 7; Evans 2004). Fearing persecution and lacking
any capacity to resist the communist takeover, much
of the Lao royal family fled overseas
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along with
thousands of their supporters. With the enemy largely
gone and thousands of Vietnamese troops in the
country to assist with security, the leadership of the
Pathet Lao and LPRP had relatively little difficulty in
maintaining relative peace and stability within much of
the country.
It was only in those areas of the country populated
by the Hmong ethnic group that the country’s new
leaders were to face continued armed resistance.
The Hmong had supported the Americans and the
royalist government during the war and continued
to oppose the communists after 1975. The Hmong
rebels were able to draw on resentment within the
LPDR at the exclusion of highland Lao from political
power – like the royalist government before it, the
LPDR was dominated by lowland Lao. At the same
time, they were able to draw recruits from Hmong
refugee camps in Thailand and attract finance from
Laotian exiles in the US and elsewhere. Although the
Thai government did not officially support the
Hmong rebels, they also gained assistance from
elements within the Thai military stationed along the
Lao border. But while this support enabled the
Hmong rebels to maintain their insurgency against
the communists following 1975, they lacked
sufficient support to pose a serious threat to the
LPRP, at least outside the highland areas that they
inhabited. When they stepped up fighting in
1989–90, they were able to cut parts of the main
road between the Plain of Jars and Vietnam and
intercept truck convoys on Route 13 but inflict little
other damage (Zasloff and Brown 1991: 152–3). With
limited resources at their disposal compared with
those of the government, they were to prove little
more than a periodic irritant.
However, the achievement of relative peace and
stability did not translate into sustained high levels of
economic growth and human development – and
hence ‘turnaround’ – during the first decade and a
half of communist rule for several reasons.
One of these was that the country’s new leaders had
little experience or ability in economic management,
reflecting the fact that they had spent much of the
previous few decades fighting guerrilla warfare
rather than running the country’s economy. Any
government would have had difficulty in promoting
turnaround in the LPDR in the mid- to late-1970s,
given the devastation caused by the War and the
extreme poverty of the country. But the policy
solutions chosen by the government simply made
matters worse (Evans 1991: 97). The victory of the
Pathet Lao was accompanied by a massive decline in
the value of the kip and runaway inflation due to the
withdrawal of US aid and the consequent collapse of
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Table 1 Level of violent conflict, 1989–2002
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Vietnam
Thailand
China
Cambodia War Inter Inter Inter Inter Inter Inter Inter Inter Inter
LPDR Min Min
Burundi Min Min Min Min Min Min Min Min Inter War Inter War War War
Inter – Intermediate level of conflict; Min – Minor level of conflict; A blank space means little or no violent
conflict during that year. 
Source Uppsala Conflict Database.
the IMF-directed Foreign Exchange Operations
Fund, which had hitherto supported the Lao
currency. As Stuart-Fox (1986: 98) pointed out, the
leadership’s response to this situation was completely
‘inappropriate’. Wage increases for government
officials and large subsidies to state-owned firms
generated a massive budget deficit and the printing
of money to fund this deficit fuelled the inflationary
spiral. Attempts to plug the budget deficit by raising
revenue through the introduction of a progressive
taxation system in the agricultural sector did little to
raise government revenues and contributed to a fall
in rice production as large numbers of peasant
farmers found ways to evade the new tax charges
and others cut rice production to reduce their tax
liability (Stuart-Fox 1986: 99; Thalemann 1997: 89).
The leadership’s over-zealous commitment to
economic reconstruction along Stalinist lines, at
least during the immediate postwar period, further
contributed to the country’s problems. The leadership
had been heavily influenced by Stalinist economic
ideas prior to coming to power, reflecting the
dominance of these ideas within the global
communist movement during this period. At the
same time, the LPDR was dependent on the Soviet
Union and Vietnam (the country’s main donors
during the late 1970s) for financial and military
resources following the war, and Vietnam stationed
thousands of soldiers in the country to help the
LPRP maintain internal security – as well as the close
personal ties between the Lao and Vietnamese
leaderships which provided further impetus for
Stalinist reform. The Soviet Union and Vietnam
actively encouraged Stalinist reform in the LPDR and
provided large numbers of economic advisers to the
Lao government to assist with the reconstruction
process. While it would be an exaggeration to
describe the LPDR’s relationship to the Soviet Union
and Vietnam as one of total subordination of the
former to the latter, it is nevertheless clear that the
latter – and particularly Vietnam – exercised
enormous influence over the former during the late
1970s (Gunn 1980; Brown and Zasloff 1978: 205–6).
The result, as General Secretary Kaysone Phomvihan
admitted in late 1979, was that the government
pursued an overly centralised model of socialism. The
defining feature of a Stalinist economy is direct
government regulation of all major economic
variables – investment, consumption, savings,
exports, imports, etc. – according to a centrally
formulated plan (Evans 1991: 84–5, 97). Accordingly,
in its first year of power, the Lao leadership
nationalised most of the LPDR’s industrial and
service sector firms (including the entire banking
system) and initiated a programme of agricultural
collectivisation (Bourdet 2000: 14).
These measures proved disastrous, both economically
and politically. The nationalisation programme
created a range of enterprises that operated more
like government departments than commercial
enterprises. Managers were required to follow
directions from above rather than commercial
imperatives, were given little control over production
decisions or the flow of funds to and from their
enterprises, and were required to focus on achieving
specified physical targets rather than financial ones
(Evans 1991: 84–5). By the late 1970s, most state-
owned enterprises were being kept in business only
because the government instructed state-owned
banks to continue lending to them despite their
inability to repay their loans. This, in turn, contributed
to a blow-out in the government’s budget deficit
and high levels of inflation during this period. The
government’s attempts to collectivise agriculture
proved equally disastrous. Farmers resisted attempts
to impose collective control over their land, animals
and equipment, resulting in lost production and
fuelling support for anti-government resistance
groups in the countryside (Stuart-Fox 1986: 98–100;
Bourdet 2000: 14). While it is unlikely that the
government would have fallen as a result of this
resistance – its tenure was more or less guaranteed
by the presence of Vietnamese troops – the
resistance no doubt contributed, along with the
continuing exodus of Lao across the border to
Thailand, to undermine the legitimacy of the new
government, particularly among the Lao peasantry,
the class whose interests it purported to represent.
In any event, the economic and political problems
caused by these policies, as well as a backing away
from Stalinist economic policies in Vietnam,
provoked a serious rethinking within the leadership
about the government’s economic strategy (Joiner
1988: 95). In the Seventh Resolution of the LPRP’s
Central Committee in 1979, the government
acknowledged that it had made some serious errors
in managing the economy and that a change of
strategy was required. Most remarkably, it argued, as
Stuart-Fox (1986: 100) has noted, that it needed ‘to
take account, in the current stage of the nation’s
economic development, of capitalist as well as
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socialist economic laws in order to promote
economic growth’. In accordance with this view, the
government introduced a series of economic policy
reforms over the next few years, the most important
of which were the suspension and then abolition of
the collectivisation programme in favour of land
distribution to family farming (Zasloff and Brown
1991: 147) and the introduction of a large package of
policy reforms in 1979. This package included the
lifting of restrictions on private participation in
business activities; the bringing of government
procurement and retail prices in line with local black
market prices; the devaluation of the kip by 60 per
cent against the US dollar; and changes to the
system of agricultural taxation designed to create an
incentive for farmers to increase production.
Combined together these policy changes
rehabilitated the role of individual entrepreneurship
within the Lao economy and marked a shift in
economic strategy towards what Kaysone labelled
‘state capitalism’ (Thalemann 1997: 91). While this shift
in policy was undoubtedly significant – not least
insofar as it paved the way for a more substantial
programme of liberal economic reform in the 1980s
– it has been argued that the leadership saw the
reforms as ‘temporary expedients until the
conditions are ripe for the construction of a true
socialist economy’ (Bedlington 1980: 111).
The introduction of these reforms led to an
improvement in the country’s economic
performance during the early to mid-1980s. Within a
year or so of the introduction of the 1979 package of
reforms, rice production had risen above the one
million tonne mark for the first time; livestock and
forestry production had increased; urban markets
had been revived; and exports had increased, in part
due to a sharp rise in hydroelectricity sales (Stuart-
Fox 1986: 101–2). As noted above, the two years
immediately following the 1979 reforms also
witnessed a dramatic (if short-lived) spurt in
economic growth. But the reforms introduced in
1979 failed to produce turnaround during this period,
in large part because of continued government
mismanagement of the economy. A particular
problem in this respect was the government’s
inability to maintain control over the budget deficit,
reflecting financial problems at state-owned banks
stemming from so-called ‘policy lending’ to the state
enterprise sector, burgeoning levels of foreign debt
stemming from the country’s dependence on foreign
assistance, and a lack of political will on the part of
the leadership to address either of these problems.
Notwithstanding the changes wrought by the
reforms of this period and the country’s improved
economic performance during the early to mid-
1980s, compared with the first few years of
communist rule, then, the country was still widely
regarded as something of a basket case in the late
1980s (Zasloff 1991).
However, the LPDR’s failure to achieve turnaround
between 1975 and 1986 was not solely the result of
poor economic management on the part of the
country’s leadership. It also reflected the country’s
location within the global political economy and the
disadvantages that this brought. There were three
disadvantages in particular. First, as an economy
based largely on subsistence agriculture, the LPDR
gained little from the commodity price booms of the
mid- to late 1970s. The problem for the LPDR was
not so much a lack of natural resource wealth – it is
endowed with a wide range of natural resources
including tin, lead, gold, iron ore, gypsum, gravel,
salt, forests and an extensive river network (giving it
great potential as a source of hydroelectrical power)
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2004: 16) – as a lack of
the basic transport and communications
infrastructure required to successfully exploit this
wealth. While other Southeast Asian countries
received substantial windfalls from the oil, forestry
and mineral price booms of the 1970s, therefore, the
LPDR went without. In fact, insofar as the country
experienced economic shocks during this period,
they were entirely negative. Between 1975 and 1989,
it experienced several droughts, all of which had a
severe impact on its level of agricultural production
(UNDP 1991: 76; Stuart-Fox 1986: 99).
Second, the country’s alignment with the Soviet bloc
meant that it did not receive many of the same
economic opportunities as other Southeast Asian
countries that were aligned with the USA during this
period. Fear within the USA and other Western
countries that communism would spread domino-like
throughout Southeast Asia led to a series of initiatives
by the US and other Western governments aimed at
promoting successful capitalist development in many
Southeast Asian countries. With the LPDR
representing a domino that had already fallen, it did
not benefit from these initiatives. Indeed, as noted
above, the victory of the Pathet Lao was greeted
with the withdrawal of US and other Western aid. It
was also met with the introduction of an economic
IDS Bulletin Volume 37  Number 2  March 2006 31
blockade by US-aligned Thailand, a move that
contributed significantly to the economic instability
that Laos experienced in the mid-1970s. The LPDR’s
receipt of aid and access to markets from the Soviet
Union and Vietnam (Zasloff 1991: 16–19) partly
compensated for the cessation of US and other
Western assistance. But these states had fewer
resources, smaller markets, and therefore much less
capacity to support economic development in the
LPDR than their Cold War opponents. At the same
time, for ideological reasons, they actively encouraged
the LPDR to pursue the Stalinist economic
restructuring agenda that proved so disastrous during
the early years of communist rule.
Third, the LPDR’s alignment with the Soviet bloc
contributed to a dramatic reduction in the country’s
human resources in the 1970s. As noted above, the
victory of the Pathet Lao precipitated the exodus of
thousands of people, many of whom sought to
escape persecution for siding with royalist forces
during the War. Among those fleeing were many
members of the country’s educated middle class who
between them accounted for most of the country’s
technical and managerial expertise and much of its
stock of private capital. Their exodus thus dramatically
reduced the country’s ability to administer the
economy in a technically proficient manner and to
mobilise domestic resources for investment. The
country’s alignment with the Soviet Union and
Vietnam also added tension to its relationship with
China, particularly as a result of the conflict in
Cambodia, in turn limiting the potential for Chinese
economic assistance.
Before moving on to the next section, it is necessary
to make two further points about the role of foreign
donors in the LPDR’s development during this period.
First, while the Soviet Union and Vietnam may have
exerted greater influence over Laos’ economic
policies between the mid-1970s and 1986 than other
donors, those Western donors that remained
engaged with the country after 1975 did exert
significant influence at key times. The World Bank,
for instance, was instrumental in persuading the
government to shift away from its Stalinist economic
strategy towards a more conservative strategy in the
late 1970s: as Stuart-Fox (1986: 100) has noted, the
rethinking of economic policy within the leadership
that led to the introduction of the 1979 package of
reforms was provoked in part by the release of a
critical World Bank report on the Lao economy in
November 1978. Some bilateral donors, most notably
Australia, also contributed to the process of market-
oriented economic reform in the LPDR during this
period through their technical assistance programmes
(Zasloff 1991: 20; Cornford 1999).
Second, whatever the role of the Soviet Union and
Vietnam in encouraging the Lao government to
pursue its disastrous Stalinist economic restructuring
strategy during the mid- to late 1970s, these
countries were crucial in ensuring the survival of the
government after 1975 and thereby preventing the
country’s disintegration. As Stuart-Fox (1986: 105) has
pointed out, successive governments in Laos/LPDR
have had difficulty in balancing their budgets since
the early years of the French administration and have
had to rely on fund transfers of one kind or another
from foreign powers to cover budget deficits. The
withdrawal of US and other Western aid in 1975 left
a massive hole in the government’s budget
(Thalemann 1997: 89), one that probably would have
made it impossible for the state to survive had it not
been for new Soviet Union and Vietnamese aid.
Certainly, the government would not have been able
to fund capital expenditure during this period, given
that this was funded largely out of its aid receipts
(Lam 1997: 280). At the same time, the Soviet Union
and Vietnam continued to support the Lao
government financially and politically through the
1980s, despite its partial embrace of capitalism.
Indeed, the Vietnamese government appears to have
encouraged the Lao government’s shift in economic
strategy, given that it was undergoing a similar
reappraisal of its economic policies at this time. The
few Western donors that remained engaged in the
LPDR after 1975 – Japan, Sweden and Australia,
were the most important – also played a significant
role in ensuring the government’s survival through
their aid programmes and thereby preventing the
country’s disintegration.
3 The political economy of progress towards
turnaround, 1986–2004
Beginning in the mid-1980s, the LPDR finally began
to make significant progress in turnaround. As noted
above, the period between 1985 and 2004 was one
of relatively strong economic growth, marked
improvement in human development and a relative
absence of violent conflict. It was also a period of
significant reduction in poverty, with the proportion
of people living below the poverty line falling from
46 per cent in 1992 to 33 per cent in 2003 (World
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Bank 2005: i). Although the LPDR was not classified
as a ‘miracle’ economy in the World Bank’s
influential 1993 report on East Asia’s economic
success (World Bank 1993), its progress towards
turnaround during this period – or more specifically
between the mid-1980s and 1997 – was sufficiently
impressive for the Assistant Director of the IMF’s
Asia and Pacific Department to suggest in 1997 that
it had achieved ‘take-off’. In contrast to many other
transition economies, he argued, the LPDR (and the
other Southeast Asian transition states, Vietnam and
Cambodia) had been able to avoid a ‘Soviet-style
output collapse in their transition to a market-based
system’, achieve macroeconomic stability and sustain
high levels of growth (Dodsworth 1997).
In explaining the country’s progress towards
turnaround during this period – and, in particular, its
strong economic growth and improved human
development – economists have emphasised the shift
in economic policies that occurred at this time
(Dodsworth 1997; Bourdet 2000; UNDP 2004).
Beginning in 1986, the government introduced a
wide-ranging programme of economic reforms that
reduced state control over the economy and
increased the role of market forces. Known as the
‘New Economic Mechanism’ (NEM), this programme
involved three phases of reform. In the first phase –
between 1986 and 1989 – it involved measures to
liberalise prices and trade, encourage state-owned
enterprises to operate more like commercial
enterprises, promote the role of private enterprise
in the economy, reform the taxation system, and
liberalise the foreign investment regime (UNDP 1991:
76–9; UNDP 2004: 6–8; Economist Intelligence Unit
2004: 21).
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In the second phase – between 1990 and
1991 – it focused on the introduction of monetary
and fiscal reforms such as the imposition of
restrictions on government and state-owned
enterprise borrowing, the introduction of high-
interest treasury certificates and bank deposits to
absorb excess liquidity and promote savings, and
attempts to rein in government spending. In the
third phase – from 1991 onwards – the NEM focused
on the introduction of structural economic reforms.
The most important of these were a privatisation
campaign aimed at selling off all state-owned
enterprises except for those deemed strategic;
measures to create a two-tier banking system in
which the central bank and the commercial banks
had well-defined and separate functions; the
recapitalisation of the banking system; a revised
foreign investment law that permitted 100 per cent
foreign ownership of business ventures (UNDP
2004: 8–10; Economist Intelligence Unit 2004: 21).
Economists suggest that these reforms facilitated
the process of turnaround and in particular, higher
rates of economic growth and improved human
development in two ways: by stabilising the economy
and stimulating foreign investment. During the mid-
to late 1980s, the LPDR experienced high levels of
inflation, partly as a result of the government’s
continued reliance on bank finance and the printing
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Table 2 LPDR: foreign direct investment inflows by sector, 1988–99 (US$ millions pledged)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999*
Agriculture – – 0.4 9.8 15.7 16.9 6.8 5.1 1.9 6.3 7.9 62.0
Garments and textiles – – 9.3 6.6 13.2 13.6 12.3 13.1 2.7 2.6 5.0 0.9
Wood-based industry – 22.0 2.8 34.5 6.8 22.4 0.6 12.0 2.1 2.5 –
Other manufacturing – 72.4 10.5 22.3 59.6 18.0 46.0 320.1 13.4 – 4.9
Mining and petroleum – 23 29.5 5.1 200.2 18.0 9.6 27.1 – 14.0 8.3 4.7
Trade 2 7 2.1 23.8 2.7 6.9 8.9 0.4 7.9 5.0 1.0 2.6
Hotels and tourism – – 7.0 95.8 6.6 4.8 279.3 0.3 211.7 0.5 1.8 –
Energy – – 0 1398.9 0 191.7 2146.0 498.4 231.8 – – –
Others – 29 5.3 3.3 33.3 36.5 30.1 24.0 504.4 18.5 96.0 19.0
*First 10 months of 1999. 
Source Freeman (2001a: 107).
of money to cover budget deficits and fund state-
owned enterprises and partly because of the
liberalisation of wages and prices in the first phase
of the NEM. The monetary and fiscal reforms
introduced in the second phase of the NEM and the
taxation reforms introduced during the first phase
served to address this situation by producing a sharp
fall in the government’s budget deficit. Between
1989 and 1993, the budget deficit fell from 12 per
cent of gross domestic product (GDP) to 4 per cent
(UNDP 2004: 8). At the same time, the liberalisation
of the foreign investment regime led to a sharp
increase in foreign direct investment (FDI),
particularly from Thailand (Than and Tan 1997: 19). In
large part this was because of a small number of
large investments in the energy industry, although
new investments in manufacturing, mining, and
hotels and tourism also contributed to the increase
(Table 2). Whereas FDI had stood at 0.7 per cent of
GDP in 1991, it had risen to 5 per cent of GDP by
1994/5 (UNDP 2004: 5). Although it then fell sharply
during the Asian crisis, mainly as a result of the
contraction of the Thai economy caused by the crisis,
it has recovered somewhat since, illustrating for
some economists the merits of these and more
recent reforms in this area (ADB 2004: 79, 81). The
higher rates of economic growth generated by
stabilisation and increased investment in turn
contributed to improved human development. The
improvement in human development does not
appear to have stemmed from changes in
government spending priorities – indeed,
government spending on education and health fell
dramatically in the early to mid-1990s (Bourdet
2000: 89). As such, it would seem that the
improvement in human development was driven
largely by increased material prosperity brought
about by growth.
One cannot deny that the introduction of the NEM
was crucial in promoting the LPDR’s progress
towards turnaround during this period. Yet to fully
understand this progress, we also need to
understand why the government adopted and
implemented these policies. In this respect,
economists’ accounts are not especially helpful – as
noted above, they have generally focused on the
policy choices that contributed to progress towards
turnaround rather than the dynamics shaping those
choices. And insofar as they have tried to explain
these choices, they have focused on the agency of
the country’s leadership. Bourdet (2000: 2), for
instance, has suggested that the introduction of the
NEM reflected a realisation on the part of LPDR’s
leaders that the state-centred economic policies
that they had pursued since 1975 had failed. ‘[B]ad
economic results between 1975 and 1986’, he argues
‘convinced the Lao leaders of the necessity of
economic reforms’. Doubtless, the country’s leaders
changed their minds about the merits of the
government’s state-centred economic strategy prior
to the mid-1980s. Yet this rethinking arguably
reflected political as much as economic
considerations.
As Zasloff and Brown (1991: 147) have pointed out,
‘shifting external forces’ over which the government
had no control played a significant role in persuading
the government to introduce the NEM. ‘The arrival,
in 1985, of Mikhail Gorbachev as prime mover in the
USSR’, they point out, ‘led to prudent Soviet
retrenchment in economic support of communist
regimes abroad, as well as political restructuring and
liberalisation at home’. This in turn forced the LPDR
to seek greater economic assistance from countries
outside the Soviet bloc. As Table 3 illustrates, the late
1980s saw a marked shift in the sources of official
development assistance (ODA) to the LPDR, with
Soviet bloc countries discontinuing their aid
programmes and the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank, among the multilaterals, and
Japan and Sweden, among the bilaterals,
significantly increasing their respective aid
programmes. The LPDR’s aid dependence increased
markedly between the mid-1980s and the early
2000s, rising from around 6 per cent to around 16
per cent of GDP (Lintner 2001: 51). Western
governments were to use their newfound structural
leverage over the Lao government to promote a
shift away from state economic control and towards
the development of a more market-based economic
system (Cornford 1999; Zasloff 1991: 19–20).
At the same time, sensing that change was in the
wind in Indochina, the Thai government switched
boldly in 1988 from ‘military confrontation at several
disputed border points to free-wheeling commerce
with its former Lao and Vietnamese antagonists’
(Zasloff and Brown 1991: 147). This opened up greater
opportunities for economic cooperation between
the two countries. Within two years, the LPDR and
Thailand had reached agreement that a new bridge
should be constructed across the Mekong; that
cooperation in areas such as trade, banking, cross-
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border taxation and agriculture should be deepened;
and that money transfers between the two countries
should be made in Thai baht rather than US dollars.
At the same time, Thailand agreed, at the LPDR’s
request, to lift a 14-year ban on the export to Laos
of 29 ‘strategic’ goods (Gunn 1990: 85–6). Combined
with the structural pressure for reform stemming
from increased dependence on the West for aid and
donors’ encouragement of reform, the growing
economic opportunities with Thailand left the Lao
government with little choice but to move away
from state control towards more open, market-
based policies.
The process of reform was also facilitated by clever
management of the politics surrounding reform. In
contrast to their earlier attempts to promote
Stalinist reconstruction in the late 1970s, the Lao
leadership successfully structured the reforms in such
a way as to minimise political opposition to reform.
While the introduction of the NEM may have
sparked a mini economic boom, and thereby
contributed to an overall increase in the LPDR’s
economic welfare, it entailed potentially significant
costs for a number of groups, particularly influential
groups within the elite. The privatisation programme,
for instance, posed a threat to the senior party and
military officials who were in charge of state-owned
enterprises insofar as it threatened to reduce their
control over these enterprises. Greater fiscal
rectitude and financial sector liberalisation also posed
a threat to this group by potentially limiting their
access to a key source of funding – state bank loans.
State bureaucrats also stood to lose from greater
fiscal rectitude insofar as it reduced the ability of the
government to increase their wages in line with
inflation, especially when inflationary pressures were
high. Recognising these political constraints, the
LPDR’s leaders built into the reform process a series
of strategic concessions to these groups. For
instance, while the privatisation programme resulted
in the sale of all but roughly 50 state-owned
enterprises by the late 1990s, many of these
enterprises were divested through leasing
arrangements and management buy-outs, leaving
ownership and control ultimately in the hands of
state enterprise managers (Freeman 2003: 39–40).
At the same time, the military was compensated for
any potential losses it suffered as a result of the
reform process by being granted new timber
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Table 3 LPDR: Sources of official development assistance (commitment basis, US$ millions)
Annual average
1981–5 1990 1995
Bilateral 102.5 54.1 174.4
CMEA/CEEC
*
86.6 – –
Japan 3.8 20.8 89.3
Sweden 8.5 15.6 13.3
Australia 2.6 3.5 26.1
Germany 0.2 5.0 18.2
France 0.2 3.4 11.9
Others 0.6 8.9 15.6
Multilateral
†
22.1 78.0 151.9
ADB 5.1 17.9 89.4
IDA 4.3 15.0 19.2
UN 9.5 18.1 15.0
Others 3.2 27.0 28.3
Total assistance 124.6 132.1 326.3
*
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance/Central and Eastern European Countries. 
†
Asian Development Bank, International Development Association of the World Bank and United Nations
agencies. 
Sources Lam (1997: 282) and OECD, Geographical Distribution of Aid Flows to Developing Countries, Statistical
Database.
contracts and trading rights (Bourdet 2000: 2–3).
Finally, the government continued ‘policy lending’ to
state-owned enterprises and introduced wage rises
for government officials at key points, despite the
effect of these measures on the budget.
This unwillingness to allow the reform process to
undermine support for the regime among elite
groups became particularly apparent following the
onset of the Asian crisis. As Freeman (2001b: 8) has
pointed out, the Asian crisis strengthened the hand
of those elements within the Lao government that
had misgivings about the speed and depth of reform
by illustrating the potential perils of integration into
the global economy: ‘It became almost accepted
wisdom that, had it not been for delays in liberalising
various elements of the economy (such as foreign
exchange and the finance sector), the impact of the
Asian crisis would have been much harder’.
Underlying this view, as Stuart-Fox (2004: 26) has
pointed out, was a fear that further economic shocks
of the magnitude of the Asian crisis could open the
way for radical political reform and, in particular, the
overthrow of the LPRP’s political monopoly. The
result was a general slowing down of the reform
process, a return to increased state control in some
areas, and a greater unwillingness on the part of the
government to maintain fiscal discipline. The
economic cost of this was renewed macroeconomic
instability: the late 1990s/early 2000s saw a return to
relatively high rates of inflation (Lintner 2000;
UNDP 2004; World Bank 2004b: 1). Yet, arguably,
these economic costs have ensured the political
sustainability of the reform process in the LPDR in
the medium to long term by reducing potential
opposition to this process from key groups within
the elite.
On the security/conflict side, the LPDR’s progress
towards turnaround during this period was facilitated
by two factors. The first of these, the successful
management of the politics of reform and the
implications of this for the country’s political stability,
has just been discussed. The second is the fact that
the Hmong rebels remained weak and, if anything,
became weaker during this period. The post-Cold
War era saw a gradual thawing of relations between
the USA and the LPDR. By late 2004, the two
countries had increased cooperation in the areas of
drug control, bomb disposal and the search for
missing US servicemen and moved to improve
economic relations by signing a bilateral trade accord
and normalising trade relations, although the USA’s
refusal to increase aid remained a point of tension.
With their erstwhile chief ally becoming more
favourably disposed to the Lao government, the
Hmong rebels have lost much of their external
support. This in turn has reduced their capacity to
oppose the government through armed resistance.
Hmong rebels are suspected of being involved in a
number of violent attacks on vehicles travelling in
remote areas and may have been behind a series of
bombings in Vientiane in 2000 (Economist
Intelligence Unit 2004: 13; Thalemann 1997: 85;
Stuart-Fox 2004: 32). But such actions are more an
irritant to the communist leadership than a serious
threat to its continued hold on power.
The role of donors in the LPDR’s development
during this period had several dimensions. First, as
noted above, donors continued to underwrite the
survival of the Lao state through the provision of
financial assistance, although it was Western donors
(and in particular multilateral donors) rather than
ones from the former Soviet bloc that played the
dominant role during this period in this respect.
Second, as also noted above, donors were a key
source of pressure for market-oriented reform. Their
role in this respect extended beyond the introduction
of reforms under the NEM to the management of
the country’s recovery from the Asian crisis. The Lao
government has been a reluctant reformer, generally
doing ‘just enough to keep foreign donors engaged,
and pumping in soft money, without really taking
ownership of, or driving forward the economic
reform and business liberalisation process’ (Freeman
2004). As the Lao government began to back-track
on reforms in the late 1990s, donors became
increasingly critical of the government’s economic
management, with one donor representative even
suggesting in early 2000 that there was ‘a need for
donors to meet separately among themselves and
decide what measures to be taken and draw
conclusions’ (as quoted in Lintner 2000: 26). With
the government’s decision to seek the IMF’s
assistance in stabilising the economy in 2001, the
pace of reform picked up again, although donors
have continued to be concerned about the
government’s lack of fiscal discipline and the
consequent high levels of inflation. Third, donors
have continued to be an important source of finance
for large infrastructure and energy projects, which
are crucial to the country’s exploitation of its natural
resource wealth, as well as government investments
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in health and education. As in the period prior to the
introduction of the NEM, donors have continued to
fund virtually all the government’s capital
expenditure. Finally, donors have been a source of
pressure for political reform and better human rights
practices, although arguably a rather ineffective one.
When the Lao government jailed two European
journalists and their American translator in 2003 for
reporting from a conflict zone off-limits to
foreigners, the Danish and Norwegian governments
announced that they were withdrawing their aid
programmes (Kazmin 2003). Yet actions such as this
have done little to stop human rights abuses and
political persecution in Laos, as countless reports on
the country’s political and human rights record
attest (USCIRF 2003; Amnesty International 2004;
US Department of State 2000; Evans 2004).
4 Conclusions
Between 1975 and the mid-1980s, the LPDR made
little progress vis-à-vis turnaround. Although the
victory of the Pathet Lao brought relative peace and
stability to the country, this did not translate into
sustained high rates of economic growth, improved
levels of human development, and hence turnaround.
Since the mid-1980s, however, the country has
made much more significant progress in turnaround.
Except for a brief downturn as a result of the Asian
economic crisis, economic growth has been fairly
strong while the country’s HDI rating has improved
considerably. At the same time, the government has
been able to maintain relative peace and stability. An
ongoing armed insurgency led by ethnic Hmong
rebels has led to periodic violent episodes in recent
years but has thus far been more of an irritant to
the communist leadership than a serious threat to its
power or to the political stability of the country.
Despite this progress, however, Laos remains one of
the poorest and least-developed countries in the
world. As the World Bank (2004a: 3) has pointed
out, the country faces a variety of serious
development challenges: life expectancy is low, two-
thirds of households have no electricity, half lack
access to safe water, 40 per cent of children are
underweight, and nearly one-third of children
between 6 and 14 do not attend school. There are
serious concerns about the quality of governance
within the country as well, corruption being a
particularly serious problem.
Whether the country will be able to overcome these
challenges and make further progress regarding
turnaround in the future will depend on three main
factors. The first of these is the outcome of the
political transition that will occur in the LPDR over
the next few years. Currently, the leadership of the
country is in the hands of a group of ageing men
who fought in the revolutionary struggle and who,
notwithstanding their adoption of the NEM, appear
to feel uncomfortable about economic liberalisation.
Most are ‘reformers by necessity’ rather than
‘reformers by conviction’. It is likely that the next few
years will see many of these figures pass from the
scene, replaced by a new, better educated
generation of political leaders. As Stuart-Fox (2004:
35) has noted, the impact that this transition will
have on the nature of economic policy in Laos is hard
to predict. While one might expect the new
generation of leaders to be more favourably disposed
towards market-based economic policies, they may
be forced to share power for a period with
remaining members of the old guard who will
exercise influence from behind the scenes, as they
have, for instance, in other Asian countries such as
China and Singapore. The second factor is the extent
to which neighbouring economies, particularly China,
Thailand and Vietnam, grow strongly in the future.
Since the mid-1980s, the LPDR has been pulled
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Figure 3 Aid dependence in LPDR, aid per capita (US$)
SourceWorld Bank, World Development Indicators CD-Rom.
Notes
* I wish to thank Nick Freeman, Phil Keefer, Sarah Cliffe
and officials at the World Bank’s office in LPDR for
comments on earlier drafts of this article. The usual
caveat applies.
1. The King and his wife stayed behind, dying later in a
Pathat Lao prison.
2. The most important such measures at this time included
the elimination of the gap between official
procurement prices and market prices, the introduction
of a market-based exchange rate, the elimination of
subsidies for agricultural inputs, the abolition of the
forced procurement of rice by the government at
below-market prices for in-kind payment of
government salaries, the simplification of export and
import taxes, the elimination of government monopoly
trading practices in all areas except for a few strategic
goods such as minerals and logs, the introduction of
requirements for state-owned enterprises to pay
market prices for capital and factor inputs and adopt
new accounting and management practices, the
granting of permission to state-owned enterprises to
retain profits for reinvestment purposes, the granting of
permission to private firms and farmers to purchase
various imported products and borrow money from the
country’s banking system, the introduction of tax
equalisation measures for public and private enterprises,
and the formulation of a foreign investment code to
encourage greater FDI (UNDP 1991: 76–9; UNDP 2004:
6–8; Economist Intelligence Unit 2004: 21).
along by the economic success of its neighbours,
particularly Thailand. If its neighbours grow strongly
in the future, it will probably continue to benefit
from their growth, particularly if this translates into
the realisation of a few major investments in
hydroelectricity and mining; if its neighbours do not
grow strongly, the benefits of proximity will probably
be less significant. Finally, the LPDR’s prospects
regarding turnaround are also likely to depend on
future changes in donor policies concerning the
distribution of aid. It is unlikely that the LPDR will
again experience a large-scale withdrawal of foreign
aid, as it did in the 1970s. Indeed, it may receive
more aid in the future. The point is simply that, as a
country dependent on aid from a few key donors
(Figure 3), the LPDR’s prospects remain tied up to
some extent with donor decisions concerning aid
distribution.
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